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These books explore a common theme: the nature and functioning
of modern educational bureaucracies. Robert Stevens provides a comprehensive historical overview of the rise of institutionalized legal training
in the United States; Duncan Kennedy attacks the inequities created by
the hierarchical structure of law schools and, by extension, of all American society; and Stephen Arons challenges the constitutionality of a
coercive majoritarian system of elementary and secondary schooling.
Each author brings to his subject the insights of a lawyer and legal
educator; their divergent views highlight the complex interplay that has
long existed between professional norms and the values of an evolving
democratic society.
Before the Civil War, as Stevens explains, law schools played only
a minor role in professional training. State legislatures prescribed few
qualifications for admission to the bar, and most aspiring attorneys
prepared for a professional career by self-study and apprenticeship in
the office of an established practitioner. A liberal recruitment policy
satisfied the demands of republican ideology, which prized aggressive
individualism and laissez-faire government. As the nation entered a
period of accelerated economic growth after 1865, however, elite lawyers-like their counterparts in other professions-called for more rigorous academic instruction as part of a general campaign to upgrade
admission requirements and weed out "unfit" applicants. The proliferation of law schools in the late nineteenth century paralleled the rise
of specialized graduate departments in American universities, and the
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teaching innovations of Christopher Columbus Langdell appealed strongly
to the scientific temper of the age.
Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895, believed
that law was a theoretical science whose overarching substantive principles could only be mastered through the careful analysis of appellate
court opinions. The "case method" of legal instruction required the use
of specially prepared casebooks of leading decisions; it also demanded
the recruitment of a new class of full-time law professors, who should
train students to reason inductively by engaging them in intensive discussion of case material-a procedure the early Langdellians modestly
termed the "Socratic dialogue." When the new approach failed to
uncover a coherent body of interlocking objective rules, its supporters
urged that it be retained for more pragmatic reasons: it taught students
the skill of "thinking like a lawyer"; it conformed with intellectual
trends in other "scientific" disciplines; and it was cost-effective, since
it worked as well with very large classes as with small ones. "The lasting
influence of the case method," Stevens notes, "was to transfer the basis
of American legal education from substance to procedure and to make
the focus of American legal scholarship-or at least legal theoryincreasingly one of process rather than doctrine" (p.56). Furthermore,
as William C. Chase has argued in a related study,' the triumph of the
case method meant that the work of important nonjudicial bodies, such
as administrative agencies, did not become the subject of serious study
in law schools until well into the twentieth century.
Not all law schools rushed to embrace the Harvard model, of course.
A more representative institution in the late nineteenth century was the
Buffalo Law School, founded by the local bar in 1887 to supplement
the clerkship experience. It was part-time, inexpensive, practical, and
open to women and minorities. Such part-time and night schools were
training almost as many students in 1916 as the regular day schools.
Confronted by increasing competition from these non-elite institutions,
Langdellian professors from thirty-two schools founded the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) in 1900 to promote uniformity in
legal education and, incidentally, to drive their rivals out of business.
The ensuing "Battle of the Standards" raged for the next fifty years,
with the American Bar Association and the AALS joined in a somewhat
prickly alliance against the middle-grade and marginal schools. Stevens
analyzes the course of this unedifying contest in painstaking detail and
relieves the tedium of statistical reports with an occasional flash of wry
humor. The motives of those who advocated the imposition of uniformly
high standards upon all schools were mixed, he observes. Altruists,
elitists, and racists supported a crusade that aimed at restricting access
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to the bar for recent immigrants, blacks, and other "undesirables."
Their early lobbying efforts made little headway against the stubborn
opposition of night school proprietors and their allies in state legislatures,
however. A major breakthrough did not occur until the 1930s, when
prolonged economic depression forced the weakest schools to shut down
and induced a majority of state legislatures to approve some ABA
proposals as a way of alleviating an overcrowded job market.
Progress toward a unitary system of legal education thereafter proceeded in two stages. During the 1930s states began to insist upon law
school training as the sole method of preparing for the bar. Apprenticeship in a law office, with its clinical and idiosyncratic features, thus
disappeared as an alternative mode of acquiring legal knowledge and
experience. Then, in the aftermath of World War II, state legislatures
moved to standardize legal education still more by requiring that students
attend only law schools approved by the ABA or the AALS. The circle
was now complete: law professors monopolized the field of legal education, and in most states applicants could not take the bar examination
unless their competence had already been certified by a diploma from
an accredited law school.
In practice a unitary and standardized model of legal education has
served to perpetuate the case method and a traditional curriculum.
Although the Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s introduced some
interdisciplinary courses and joint-degree programs, their "functionalism" did not lead to any major restructuring of the form or content
of legal training. Nor have later initiatives produced more positive results.
The contemporary law school, Stevens concludes, remains essentially a
trade school, whose curriculum owes much to the attitudes of the or2
ganized bar and to the requirements of standardized bar examinations.
Duncan Kennedy's "polemic against the system" attributes the conditions described in Law School to one overriding cause: the dominance
of "illegitimate hierarchies" throughout American society. "The general
thesis," he remarks,
is that law schools are intensely political places, in spite of the
fact that they seem intellectually unpretentious, barren of theoretical ambition or practical vision of what social life might
be. The trade school mentality, the endless attention to trees at
the expense of forests, the alternating grimness and chumminess
of focus on the limited task at hand, all these are only a part
of what is going on. The other part is ideological training for
willing service in the hierarchies of the corporate welfare state
(p.1).

2. This summary derives from my earlier review of Stevens's book. See Bloomfield,
Book Review, 8 ALSA Forum 487 (1984).
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In more specific terms, Kennedy charges that the "Socratic" method
conditions students to submit to authoritarian role models (e.g., white,
middle-class, male professors and their postgraduate analogues, judges
and senior partners); that "legal reasoning," as taught by the case
method, ignores political values and justifies existing legal rules; and
that a meritocratic ideology conceals glaring inequities in admission and
placement procedures. An oppressive legal hierarchy further replicates
and reinforces other hierarchical structures that together compose the
modern capitalist state.
"[Tihe state," Kennedy argues in a perceptive passage, "has blurred
into the rest of society just as the proletariat has blurred into the middle
class" (p.87). Private groups routinely perform public functions today,
and power is dispersed among many "corporate cells," whose internal
hierarchies rely upon a common meritocratic ideology for their legitimacy. The only way to effect fundamental change in such a system is
to transform it cell by cell, "until we reach the critical point at which
the interconnectedness of the system makes it possible to develop it as
a whole toward a new unity" (p.98).
For radical law students and professors, Kennedy recommends a
"workplace struggle" against hierarchical oppression that might include:
calculated student disruption of authoritarian classes; demands for a
new curriculum, which should emphasize clinical experience and feature
an interdisciplinary "legal decision course" to point up the ideological
nature of law; proposals for changes in the placement process to enhance
the competitive position of small and politically activist law firms; and
the formation of "left study groups," as testing grounds for the development of non-hierarchical relationships. Since group self-determination is central to Kennedy's thinking, he refuses to define specific
goals and policies for the emerging egalitarian society. He concedes,
however, that his "left bourgeois intelligentsia" may have an uphill fight
in seeking to mobilize those enmeshed in the system; and this caveat,
I fear, may apply with special force to organizational efforts in the law
school workplace. For if the educational process is as inherently ideological as Kennedy contends, how can one hope to prevail against the
sixteen years of brainwashing and exposure to false meritocratic values
which law students have already experienced?
Such, at least, is one lesson to be drawn from Stephen Arons's
Compelling Belief. Arons charges that compulsory public education, as
it has developed in the United States since the late nineteenth century,
has enabled local political majorities to impose their cultural values upon
dissenters, in violation of First Amendment guarantees. To support this
position, he takes a close and sympathetic look at three forms of dissent
that have assumed increasing importance in recent years: censorship
battles over textbooks and the "world view" they convey; efforts by
disaffected families to educate their children at home; and the creation
of alternative schools by private groups determined to preserve a distinctive subculture. Although some of these challenges to "state-sup-
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ported orthodoxy" have been resolved through litigation, Arons argues
that judges have failed to recognize the true nature of the problem:
Most judges and legislators have not perceived the centrality of
school socialization to the lives of families and the raising of
children; neither have they acknowledged the relationship between the formation of world views in children and the expression of opinion protected by the First Amendment. And finally,
the courts have been so preoccupied with preventing religious
impositions in publicly supported schools that they have virtually
ignored the more significant imposition of ideology (p.198).
The remedy, he suggests, lies in an expansive judicial reading of
the free speech and free press provisions of the First Amendment, for
which a precedent may be found in the "underutilized" case of West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).1 There the United States
Supreme Court stuck down a compulsory flag salute law because it
forced public school students to declare a belief and thus violated their
right to freedom of opinion under the First Amendment. Arons would
like to extend this principle to protect the formation, as well as the
expression, of individual opinion against manipulation by a coercive
educational bureaucracy. Because children in public schools are conditioned to accept majoritarian ideological premises, Arons urges, it is
essential to the future of the democratic process that dissidents be
permitted to develop, within their own institutions, alternative visions
of the general welfare. Before the chief victims of majoritarian orthodoxy-the poor, the working class, and racial minorities-can exercise
their new freedom, however, the entire educational system must be
restructured along libertarian lines:
To create a separation of school and state and to establish
government neutrality in place of the current ideological favoritism requires insuring the reality of school choice for all families
and prohibiting local, state, or federal governments from regulating the content of nongovernment schooling, directly or indirectly, except where compelling justifications [such as preventing
racial discrimination in schools] exist (p.213).
Whatever one may think of Arons's remedial program-and, in my
view, it would promote cultural chaos rather than pluralism-there is
no doubt that he has written a thoughtful and provocative study. Like
Stevens and Kennedy, he has probed deeply into the relationship between
law, education, and society, with results that should interest any serious
observer of contemporary American life.
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